A. Murinson The 'strategic depth' doctrine calls for an activist engagement with all regional systems in the Turkey's neighbourhood Ahmet Davutoglu is a . Join for free. Download full-text PDF The Review Article: Strategic Depth ( Stratejik Derinlik). M. Cuneyt Ahmet Davutoğlu, in his book, Stratejik. Derinlik is . PDF | On Apr 1, , Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and others published The Ahmet Davutoğlu. possesses “strategic depth” due to its history and.
|Language:||English, Spanish, Japanese|
|Distribution:||Free* [*Sign up for free]|
This study explores Davutoğlu's strategic vision, the extent to which reference to Ahmet Davutoğlu. possesses “strategic depth” due to its history and. policy from the perspective of (a) the “Strategic Depth” of Ahmet Davutoğlu, “ Strategic Depth” is one of the most important analyses about Turkish foreign policy. Davutoglus second bite at strategic depth.. Turkish President-elect Recep Tayyip Erdogans choice of. Ahmet Davutoglu as his prime minister is.
Produced by the company PanaFilm, aired in Turkey in and exported to the Arab world in , this series promotes an image of Turkey as a powerful country able to confront the West. The message conveyed, whether intentionally or unintentionally, is the following: Turkey is a nation who has the political courage to challenge Western domination and to stand up for moral values.
The story is inspired by the Mavi Marmara Flotilla episode. By portraying Turkey as the champion of the Palestinian cause, the movie seduced the Arab audience and pushed it to perceive Turkey as a good leader at the regional and international level, and as a legitimate and credible representative of the Arab world. In terms of production, the Turkish soap opera industry is highly developed compared to its Arab counterpart. Benefitting from a good economic situation in their country, production companies are dedicating huge budgets to create high-standard series that can compete with international and American hit series.
The quality of the image and sound, the professional performance and the charisma of the actors, the realistic scenarios, the attractiveness of the music and theme song, and the beauty of the picturesque shots at the Bosphorus, in luxurious villas , have all contributed to the popular appeal of these series.
Moreover, the format used made the series competitive: The majority of the diziler are made up of two to four seasons, each composed of thirty minute episodes. This makes them price-competitive, as broadcasters and TV channels buy long episodes that can fill up lengthy airing time.
Hence, the success of Turkish soap operas lies in part in their production strategies. In fact, Turkish diziler are dubbed not in classical Arabic but in colloquial Arabic, the language that people use in their daily life.
Through the use of dialects with which people can connect, these series easily penetrate the minds of the Arab public and allow the viewers to identify with the characters and accept the message that is indirectly conveyed in the scenario.
The dialect, in this sense, creates a sense of proximity between the Arab viewer and the soap opera on the one hand, and between Turkish and Arab societies on the other hand. Dubbing was made in Syrian dialect rather than Egyptian dialect. In our opinion, this choice might have been driven by two factors.
The first relates to market economics: Given that in the s Syrian musalsat dethroned their Egyptian counterparts and became more popular, it was logical and rational that the Turkish series be dubbed in this dialect to ensure their success. The soap opera industry has therefore benefitted from the Turkish-Syrian honeymoon.
It is indeed highly probable that the dubbing in Syrian dialect was made possible by the political rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara. These series are now being dubbed in Dubai by Emirati companies Therefore, the title in itself made the series very appealing for the Arab public.
These shortcomings of the Arab media have therefore left a room for the Turkish diziler to take hold in Middle East societies. It is important here to consider the interaction between these actors and the Turkish government, and to study the role, if any, played by the latter.
Our field research and interviews with Turkish producers show clearly that production companies did not receive any kind of material or moral support from political actors and governmental circles.
Two anecdotes provide concrete illustrations. In particular, the Prime minister claimed that the series misrepresented Suleiman the Magnificent by portraying him as an emotional man who spent more time in the harem than in conquests. The series was in fact taken off TV channels and from Turkish airlines flights for over a week.
It will bind us to each other. It will unite our hearts. It will serve to deepen our relationships, strengthen our brotherhood, and consolidate our union TRT Al Arabiyya We have given a shape to history together. Be sure that we will give a shape to the future altogether. We are the members of a civilization that places high importance on neighborliness. With limited experience and resources compared to other leading channels in the region such as Al Jazeera, Al Arabiyya, Al Hurra, or France 24 in Arabic, TRT struggles to win a share of the Arab media market and to compete with well-established channels.
Moreover, our field research shows that TRT is not appealing to Arab viewers Thus, given these observations, it is difficult to say that TRT Al Arabiyya is a successful soft power tool. During our interview with Hamze Tekin, the vice-president of the Anadolu Agency in Beirut, the latter stated the following: 27 Interview, Beirut, September Our role is to tell a grand narrative about Turkey.
We need the Arab world to better understand Turkey and what our great government is doing. We also serve the other way round: We collect information about the Arab world for our government so that they can make informed decisions and policy choices The majority of Arab news channels quote Anadolu as their source when mentioning news related to Turkey; they therefore unknowingly reproduce and spread the official discourse of Turkey. First, it is theoretically and practically difficult — not to say impossible — to measure the concrete impact of a soft power initiative.
The political science community lacks quantitative instruments to gauge and determine the real consequences of soft power. For instance, during the Arab revolutions, people in the Middle East did not align their political positions with the views of Ankara, even though they watched Turkish soap operas. The best illustration of this is the fact that the Middle East region is amongst the biggest consumers of American films and at the same time shows high levels of anti-Americanism.
What is more, given the religious and cultural diversity of the Middle East populations, soap operas have failed to please everybody and to create a positive perception of Turkey in the minds of all Arab people. Following Russian expansionism in the Balkans under the banner of pan-Slavism in the later half of the nineteenth century, pan-Turanism arose as a romantic idea to unify Turkic, Mongol and Finnish-Ugorian peoples.
This transformation hinges upon a growing embrace of the philosophy of neo-Ottomanism. This doctrine, known as the Strategic Depth doctrine, found particular resonance among the AK party leadership and its core electorate. The acceptance of such a dramatic shift in foreign policy vision is also due to the changed perceptions of the foreign policy establishment and the military of external circumstances Syria and Iran ceased to be viewed as enemies after the resolution of the Turkish—Syrian crisis in and heightened domestic empathy with Muslim causes such as the Palestinian cause and the opposition to the American occupation of Iraq.
His thinking was compared with the strategic vision of American neo-conservatives. But Ahmet Davutoglu responded to this charge: A comparison with neo-cons does not seem very accurate to me. Especially in view of developments to do with the Middle East and its surroundings, we may agree that the neo-cons produce speculative ideas but I have serious doubts about whether they construct theories having objective validity and rational frameworks.
His era as a Turkish leader was characterized by his singular involvement in the restructuring of the Turkish economy and robust internal and activist foreign policy. His style of governance had so many common themes with the concurrent rule of the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, that some in Turkey called it Ozalism.
This saying essentially enunciated the era of isolationism in foreign policy and rejection of the claims of pan-Turkist movement for political union with external Turks Turkic-speaking peoples of Caucasus and Central Asia.
He also put his personal stamp on foreign policy making in Turkey. He achieved this by changing the institutional framework of foreign policy decision making. When Recep Erdogan became prime minister in March , as a result of the overwhelming victory of his AK party in November , he again assumed an activist prime-ministerial role in Turkish foreign policy.
Consequently, Turkey, as a result of its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses great geographical depth. Until involvement in the current Turkish government, he served as the head of the international relations department at Beykent University. Davutoglu obtained a doctorate in philosophy from Bogazici University. His interests embrace not only politics and international relations, but also philosophy, history, geography, especially its specialized branch geopolitics, as well as cultural studies and economics.
The nucleus of a new foreign approach appeared in an article titled The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World Dis Order which appeared in In this article a former Turkish academic proposes an alternative to the two dominant Eurocentric theories, which attempted to explain the ongoing global processes. He explains that the strategic balance promoted by the United Stated during the cold war based upon the Charter of the United Nations ended after the First Gulf War.
He con- cludes that: The purported cultural and civilizational clashes are very minor reasons for this chaotic atmosphere because this region is an integral part of the same civilization, namely the Islamic civilization, with the exceptions of Armenia and the Christian parts of Georgia. In particular, he chooses the example of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The polemist criticizes Western-led globalization and accuses it of being an attempt to homogenize diverse cultures, if not completely destroy non-western civilizations, and calls instead for dialogue of civilizations.
The existing civilizational crisis could only be overcome by a civilizational dialogue and a free exchange of values. Uni- cultural monopolization has been the main dilemma of modern western civilization and has led to the destruction of traditional civilisations. The current revival of traditional civilizations is a reaction against this uni-cultural monopolization.
The strict nationalist and secularist dogmas of Kemalism were institutionalized in the dominant bureaucratic-authoritarian apparatus of state. All these themes found their way into a novel foreign policy doctrine, which animates the foreign policy vision of the current Turkish government. The academic anti-western rhetoric is coated in anti-colonialist phraseology.
He provided a periodization for the evolution of non-western i. Muslim societies in the twentieth century. The main thesis of this doctrine is that the strategic depth is predicated on historical depth and geographical depth.
In his comparative analysis, he comes to the conclusion that these countries experience similar problems of ethno-nationalism, separatism and general anti- imperialist dissension in their respective regions.
As a result, Turkey, due to its A. Murinson historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses a great geographical depth. With reference to Turkey, he notes: Geographical depth is a part of historical depth. For instance, Turkey is not just any old Mediterranean country. One important characteristic that distinguishes Turkey from say Romania or Greece is that Turkey is at the same time a Middle Eastern and a Caucasian country. Unlike Germany, Turkey is as much a European country as it is an Asian country.
Indeed, Turkey is as much a Black Sea country as it is a Mediterranean one. He also stresses a shift in geopolitical status of Turkey from a barrier, predicated on its NATO membership during the cold war, to a bridge to a new regional system, which extends beyond Erzurum Plain and includes states of Caucasus and Eurasia.
In this book Davutoglu particularly criticizes the failures of Turkish Foreign Policy Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union in the early s. Davutoglu points to the wrong-headedness of this approach based on Turkist sentiments. He notes also the dearth of academics in Turkey with knowledge in geopolitical regional balance as well as the absence of appropriate intellectual understanding of this foreign policy failure.
Davutoglu called for re-engagement with the Middle Eastern region, in particular with Iran, Syria and the Gulf States. In the Balkan region he stressed the importance of Greece and Bulgaria, while in Caucasus he pointed to robustness of Georgian—Turkish relations. He emphasized the importance of economic interdependency in the globalizing world and the need to build strong economic linkages with all regional states.
In order to accomplish this Turkey calls upon its neighbors to undertake political and economic reforms themselves. The new Turkish government demonstrated its A.
Murinson willingness to reconcile with the Muslim world. In particular, the Erdogan government took an activist approach in its relations with its neighbours to the east Iran and south Iraq, Syria , while the bilateral relations with Israel entered a cooler period.
Turkish diplomacy is trying to mobilize public opinion in the region now. The possibility of war in Iraq and its dismemberment raised the spectre of the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and separatist demands among the Turkish Kurds.
Turkey pursued all avenues to prevent this occurring. The objective of this meeting was to prevent hostilities in the wake of the Second Gulf War.
The symbolism of a convention of representatives of Muslim states in an Ottoman-era Palace52 was not lost on the Middle Eastern audience.
These two provinces in northern Iraq are predominantly populated by Kurds. Turkey has raised international alarm that the Kurdish leaders might conduct ethnic cleansing of Turcomans from the provincial urban areas. Suppressing the painful memories of the division of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish political elite promotes Turkey as the guarantor of peace in contemporary Iraq.
Murinson bilateral agreements in the Sixth Turkish—Syrian Protocol, which covers the economic sphere, duty-free trade, tourism and educational exchange. The Syrian leadership also recognized the international legal framework of the acceptance of Turkish borders and the territorial integrity of Iraq. Both countries share a deep concern over the Kurdish aspirations for autonomy in northern Iraq and the possible negative repercussions for Turkish and Syrian Kurdish minorities.
As American and European pressure mounted on Syria to withdraw its troops and intelligence forces from Lebanon, President Sezer announced that he would proceed with his state visit to Syria.
This was widely understood in Turkish diplomatic circles as an American warning to cancel the Syrian trip. Turkish and Syrian sides underline their common interests and historical links as the basis for their new relationship. They share unanimity about the preservation of the territorial integrity of Iraq.
During the AK government this relationship experienced a turnaround. In July Prime Minister Erdogan visited Teheran and signed a multi-dimensional cooperation scheme that included a joint commitment to security cooperation with Iran in the struggle against the PKK and a series of economic agreements.
Economic cooperation involved agreements about deliveries of Iranian gas to Europe through Turkish territory and of a pricing dispute over natural gas supplied by Iran to Turkey. We did not make any discrimination among our neighbours. The regional peace will be set up in this way.